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ABOUT THIS PAPER
This paper summarises the use of analytics and algorithms for policing 
within England and Wales, and explores different types of bias that can 
arise during the product lifecycle. The findings are based on in-depth 
consultation with police forces, civil society organisations, academics and 
legal experts. The primary purpose of the project is to inform the Centre 
for Data Ethics and Innovation's ongoing review into algorithmic bias in 
the policing sector. RUSI’s second and final report for this project will be 
published in early 2020, to include specific recommendations for the final 
Code of Practice, and incorporating the cumulative feedback received 
during the consultation process.
The authors made an equal contribution to this paper, and are very grateful 
to Jamie Grace, Pete Fussey, Malcolm Chalmers, Cathy Haenlein and the 
RUSI Publications team for providing helpful feedback on an earlier draft 
of this report. 
SUMMARY 
• The use of data analytics and algorithms for policing has numerous 
potential benefits, but also carries significant risks, including those 
relating to bias. This could include unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of protected characteristics, real or apparent skewing of 
the decision-making process, or outcomes and processes which are 
systematically less fair to individuals within a particular group. These 
risks could arise at various stages in the project lifecycle. 
• Algorithmic fairness cannot be understood solely as a matter 
of data bias, but requires careful consideration of the wider 
operational, organisational and legal context, as well as the overall 
decision-making process informed by the analytics. 
• While various legal frameworks and codes of practice are relevant to 
the police’s use of analytics, the underlying legal basis for use must 
be considered in parallel to the development of policy and regulation. 
Moreover, there remains a lack of organisational guidelines or clear 
processes for scrutiny, regulation and enforcement. This should be 
addressed as part of a new draft code of practice, which should specify 
clear responsibilities for policing bodies regarding scrutiny, regulation 
and enforcement of these new standards.
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INTRODUCTION
RUSI was commissioned by the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) 
to conduct an independent research study on the use of data analytics by 
police forces in England and Wales, with a focus on algorithmic bias. The 
primary purpose of the project is to inform CDEI’s review into algorithmic 
bias in the policing sector. 
CDEI’s review will work towards a draft Code of Practice for the development, 
trialling and implementation of data analytics in policing, which will mitigate 
risk of bias and address wider legal and ethical concerns. 
This briefing paper is the first of two papers to be published as part of this 
project. Its purpose is to outline the main issues identified by the research 
so far, and to offer contextual information for stakeholders providing 
feedback on the draft Code of Practice, due to be published by CDEI. The 
second RUSI paper will be published in early 2020 and will include specific 
recommendations for the final CDEI Code of Practice, incorporating feedback 
received during the consultation process. 
Building on RUSI’s existing work in this area, this project combines 
semi-structured key informant interviews, roundtables and focus groups, 
and a selected review of literature focused on data analytics and algorithmic 
bias. To date, key informant interviews have been conducted with 13 
representatives of various UK law enforcement agencies, and five academics 
and legal experts. In addition, two roundtable events were held in London in 
July 2019. The first brought together 16 representatives from the commercial 
police technology sector and was organised in partnership with TechUK, 
while the second brought together 27 participants from police forces, civil 
society organisations, government departments, and academic and legal 
experts. A semi-structured interview protocol was used systematically 
throughout.1 Further interviews are planned and the second paper will 
include cumulative insights from all interviews, discussion of the regulatory 
and oversight regime, and comments on the draft Code of Practice.
This briefing paper summarises the use of analytics and algorithms for 
policing in England and Wales, before discussing different types of bias that 
can arise during the product lifecycle. The purpose of this paper is not to 
offer solutions or recommendations as to how these risks can be addressed; 
this will be discussed in detail in the second paper. Instead, this briefing 
paper highlights the most significant gaps in the existing policy framework 
where future regulatory attention should be focused. 
For a more general overview of the state of police technology in England 
and Wales, see RUSI’s 2017 paper ‘Big Data and Policing: An Assessment of 
1. Throughout this report, an anonymised coding system is used to refer to 
interview data. The prefix ‘L’ is used to refer to law enforcement representatives, 
while ‘A’ refers to academic and legal experts. 
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Law Enforcement Requirements, Expectations and Priorities’.2 For a more 
detailed discussion of the types of machine learning algorithms currently in 
use, a useful starting point is RUSI’s 2018 report ‘Machine Learning Algorithms 
and Police Decision-Making: Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Challenges’.3
POLICE USE OF DATA ANALYTICS IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES
UK police forces collect vast amounts of digital data, but have historically 
lacked the technological capabilities to effectively analyse this data to 
improve operational effectiveness and efficiency.4 However, police forces 
are increasingly adopting advanced analytical tools to derive insights from 
the data they collect, to inform decision-making, resource prioritisation and 
risk assessment in a range of contexts.
The analytical tools used by police forces increasingly employ forms of 
machine learning, often referred to as artificial intelligence. However, this 
latter description is ambiguous and poorly defined, so for the purposes of 
this paper the technology in question is referred to as ‘machine learning’. 
Machine learning algorithms are currently used for various policing 
purposes, including: facial recognition and video analysis; mobile phone 
data extraction; social media intelligence analysis; predictive crime mapping; 
and individual risk assessment.5 This report focuses on these latter two 
applications of machine learning, which are frequently referred to as forms 
of ‘predictive policing’.6 However, many of the same legal, ethical and policy 
issues apply to other uses of machine learning in policing, including those 
linked to classification, explanation and resource allocation. 
While the use of predictive policing tools in the UK can be traced back to at 
least 2004,7 advances in machine learning have enabled the development 
2. Alexander Babuta, ‘Big Data and Policing: An Assessment of Law Enforcement 
Requirements, Expectations and Priorities’, RUSI Occasional Papers (September 
2017).
3. Alexander Babuta, Marion Oswald and Christine Rinik, ‘Machine Learning 
Algorithms and Police Decision-Making: Legal, Ethical and Regulatory 
Challenges’, Whitehall Report, 3-18 (September 2018).
4. Babuta, ‘Big Data and Policing’.
5. The Law Society Commission on the Use of Algorithms in the Justice System 
and the Law Society of England and Wales, ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice 
System’, June 2019. 
6. Beth Pearsall, ‘Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement’, National 
Institute of Justice Journal (No. 266, 2010), pp. 16–19; Jennifer Bachner, ‘Predictive 
Policing: Preventing Crime with Data and Analytics’, IBM Center for the Business 
of Government, 2013; Walter L Perry et al., Predictive Policing: The Role of 
Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2013). 
7. Kate J Bowers et al., ‘Prospective Hot-Spotting: The Future of Crime Mapping?’, 
British Journal of Criminology (Vol. 44, No. 5, September 2004), pp. 641–58; 
The use of 
algorithms to make 
predictions about 
future crime
and offending 
raises considerable 
legal and ethical 
questions
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of more sophisticated systems, which are now used for a wider range of 
functions. The use of algorithms to make predictions about future crime 
and offending raises considerable legal and ethical questions, particularly 
concerning the risk of bias and discrimination.8 
DOES IT WORK? 
Before discussing the risks of bias arising from predictive policing technology, 
it is important to address the fundamental question – ‘does it work?’ It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to critically assess the (dis)advantages of a 
risk assessment-focused approach to resource allocation, or to discuss the 
semantic nuances associated with defining ‘risk’. However, on the basis that 
police forces must target limited resources to places and people identified as 
posing the greatest ‘risk’ (of offending or victimisation), this paper’s starting 
point is to question whether algorithmic tools are effective in assisting the 
police to identify and understand this risk. Effectiveness and accuracy are 
intrinsically linked to ethics and legality: if it cannot be demonstrated that 
a particular tool or method is operating effectively and with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy, it may not be possible to justify the use of such a tool as 
necessary to fulfil a particular policing function.9 
First, in relation to predictive mapping, empirical evidence has 
demonstrated that the deployment of predictive mapping software could 
increase the likelihood of detecting future crime events when compared to 
non-technological methods, resulting in net reductions in overall crime 
rates.10 Research shows that random foot patrolling has a negligible 
impact on detecting and preventing crime, because crime is not uniformly 
distributed in time and space.11 By contrast, ‘hotspot’ policing – whereby 
high-risk locations are identified and patrol resources concentrated in 
those areas – has been shown to result in crime suppression not just at 
Shane D Johnson et al., Prospective Crime Mapping in Operational Context, Final 
Report, Home Office Online Report 19/07 (London: The Stationery Office, 2007). 
8. Hannah Couchman, ‘Policing by Machine’, Liberty, January 2019. 
9. Author’s telephone interview with A4, academic expert in human rights and 
technology, 11 July 2019.
10. Johnson et al., Prospective Crime Mapping in Operational Context; Kate J Bowers 
et al., ‘Spatial Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits Among Geographically 
Focused Policing Initiatives: A Meta-Analytical Review’, Journal of Experimental 
Criminology (Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2011), pp. 347–74. 
11. George L Kelling et al., ‘The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment’, Police 
Foundation, 1974; Lawrence W Sherman, Patrick R Gartin and Michael E 
Buerger, ‘Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology 
of Place’, Criminology (Vol. 27, No. 1, February 1989), pp. 27–56; Shane D Johnson 
et al., ‘Space–Time Patterns of Risk: A Cross National Assessment of Residential 
Burglary Victimization’, Journal of Quantitative Criminology (Vol. 23, No. 3, 
2007), pp. 201–19; Anthony A Braga, ‘The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime’, 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Vol. 578, No. 1, 
November 2001), pp. 104–25.
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the deployment location but also in surrounding areas.12 In the UK, field 
trials have found predictive mapping software to be around twice as likely to 
predict the location of future crime as traditional intelligence-led techniques 
(whereby analysts manually identify future hotspots).13 
Despite its apparent effectiveness, the use of predictive mapping software 
by UK police forces has been limited.14 In many cases, its use has amounted 
only to short-term trials that did not result in full-scale deployment.15 
The evidence is less clear when it comes to the accuracy of individual 
risk-assessment tools, largely due to a lack of research on the algorithms 
in use. Nevertheless, there is a large body of research dating back more 
than 60 years comparing the accuracy of ‘unstructured’ professional 
judgement and statistical (‘actuarial’) forecasting methods, which it is not 
possible to discuss here.16 Various meta-analyses and systematic reviews 
have found that – under controlled conditions – statistical forecasting 
consistently outperforms unstructured professional judgement in a range of 
decision-making contexts, including offender risk assessment.17 
However, experts disagree over the predictive validity of statistical 
risk-assessment tools.18 Predictive validity can be understood as ‘the extent 
to which scores on an assessment tool are able to predict some outcome 
12. Lawrence W Sherman and David Weisburd, ‘General Deterrent Effects of Police 
Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomized, Controlled Trial’, Justice Quarterly 
(Vol. 12, No. 4, 1995), pp. 625–48; Rob T Guerette and Kate J Bowers, ‘Assessing 
the Extent of Crime Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits: A Review of 
Situational Crime Prevention Evaluations’, Criminology (Vol. 47, No. 4, November 
2009), pp. 1331–68; College of Policing, ‘The Effects of Hot-Spot Policing on 
Crime: What Works Briefing’, September 2013. 
13. George Mohler et al., ‘Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing’, 
Journal of the American Statistical Association (Vol. 110, No. 512, 2015),  
pp. 1399–411; Kent Police Corporate Services Analysis Department, ‘PredPol 
Operational Review [Restricted and Heavily Redacted]’, <http://www.statewatch.
org/docbin/uk-2014-kent-police-predpol-op-review.pdf>, accessed 14 August 
2019.
14. Conchman, ‘Policing by Machine’, p. 45.
15. Conchman, ‘Policing by Machine’, pp. 45–61; Babuta, ’Big Data and Policing’.
16. For further discussion, see Robyn M Dawes, David Faust and Paul E Meehl, 
‘Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment’, Science (Vol. 243, No. 4899, 1989),  
pp. 1668–74; William M Grove and Paul E Meehl, ‘Comparative Efficiency of 
Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) 
Prediction Procedures: The Clinical–Statistical Controversy’, Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law (Vol. 2, No. 2, 1996), pp. 293–323.
17. Paul E Meehl, Clinical Vs. Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and 
a Review of the Evidence (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1954); William M Grove et al., ‘Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A 
Meta-Analysis’, Psychological Assessment (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2000), p. 19.
18. See, for example, Stephen D Hart and David J Cooke, ‘Another Look at the  
(Im-)Precision of Individual Risk Estimates Made Using Actuarial Risk Assessment 
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measure’.19 However, if a statistical tool is used to make predictions at the 
individual level, the uncertainty associated with any single event probability 
is very large. As summarised by Alan A Sutherland and colleagues, ‘predictive 
judgments are meaningful when applied to groups of offenders. However, 
at an individual level, predictions are considered by many to be imprecise’.20 
Put simply, high accuracy rates at the group level can often conceal very 
low accuracy rates for specific individuals or groups of individuals within 
that larger group. All individual predictions are associated with a confidence 
interval (a margin of error), which is often not taken into account when 
reporting the overall ‘predictive accuracy’ of the tool. 
Academic experts interviewed for this study expressed reservations 
regarding the ability of algorithmic tools to predict future crime, indicated 
by comments such as ‘there are a lot of myths around machine learning 
tools and what they can do. One of the things that machine learning is really 
terrible at is predicting rare and infrequent events, especially when you 
don’t have loads of data’.21 With this in mind, the more infrequent the event 
the tool is trying to predict, the less accurate it is likely to be. Furthermore, 
accuracy is often difficult to calculate, because when an individual is judged 
to pose a risk of offending, an intervention is typically delivered which 
prevents the predicted outcome from happening. Authorities cannot know 
what may have happened had they not intervened, and therefore there is no 
way to test the accuracy (or otherwise) of the prediction. 
Independent, methodologically robust evaluation of trials is essential 
to demonstrate the accuracy and effectiveness of a particular tool or 
method. If such evaluation does not demonstrate the tool’s effectiveness 
and proportionality, continued use would raise significant legal concerns 
regarding whether use of the tool was justified to fulfil a particular policing 
function, requiring the police force to review its design and operational 
use. Conversely, if there is evidence that a new capability is beginning to 
perform well, it is important to invest in building the evidence base for its 
effectiveness, with processes in place for ongoing evaluation. 
THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
In England and Wales, a small number of police forces have developed 
machine learning algorithms to assess reoffending risk for known offenders 
Instruments’, Behavioral Sciences and the Law (Vol. 31, No. 1, January/February 
2013), pp. 81–102.
19. Mia Debidin (ed.), A Compendium of Research and Analysis on the Offender 
Assessment System (OASys) 2006–2009 (London: Ministry of Justice, 2009),  
p. 78. 
20. Alan A Sutherland et al., ‘Sexual Violence Risk Assessment: An Investigation 
of the Interrater Reliability of Professional Judgments Made Using the Risk for 
Sexual Violence Protocol’, International Journal of Forensic Mental Health  
(Vol. 11, No. 2, 2012), p. 120. 
21. Academic expert during Interdisciplinary Roundtable event hosted by RUSI and 
the CDEI, London, 25 July 2019. 
Independent, 
methodologically 
robust evaluation 
of trials is essential
BRIEFING PAPER 8
in the force area, to inform prioritisation of operational activity and to 
assist decision-making at the entry point to the criminal justice system. For 
instance, Durham Constabulary’s Harm Assessment Risk Tool uses random 
forest forecasting (a form of supervised machine learning) to classify 
individuals in terms of their likelihood of committing a violent or nonviolent 
offence over the next two years.22 The purpose is to assist officers in 
assessing offenders’ eligibility to participate in the Checkpoint Programme, 
a voluntary out-of-court disposal scheme designed to reduce reoffending by 
addressing the underlying factors causing individuals to engage in crime.23 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary uses similar technology to assess factors 
such as likelihood of reoffending, likelihood of victimisation/vulnerability, 
and likelihood of committing a range of specific offences. Through an app 
on their mobile devices, neighbourhood officers can instantly access the risk 
profiles for each offender registered in the force area, which are recalculated 
on a daily basis.24 West Midlands Police are developing a similar offender 
assessment system as part of their Data Driven Insights project,25 while 
Hampshire Constabulary is developing a machine learning predictive tool to 
assess risk of domestic violence offending.26 
The current technological landscape was described by one police officer 
interviewed as a ‘patchwork quilt, uncoordinated and delivered to different 
standards in different settings and for different outcomes’.27 However, the 
use of analytics and algorithms by police forces in England and Wales is likely 
to grow in both scale and sophistication in the coming years. It is essential 
to build a stronger evidence base on the effectiveness and reliability of 
different systems, and to develop a clearer legal, policy and regulatory 
framework to ensure proportionate and ethical use of this increasingly 
powerful technology. 
 
22. Sheena Urwin, ‘Algorithmic Forecasting of Offender Dangerousness for Police 
Custody Officers: An Assessment of Accuracy for the Durham Constabulary 
Model’, unpublished thesis, University of Cambridge, 2016.
23. Durham Constabulary, ‘Checkpoint’, <https://www.durham.police.uk/
Information-and-advice/Pages/Checkpoint.aspx>, accessed 14 August 2019.
24. Lina Dencik et al., ‘Data Scores as Governance: Investigating Uses of Citizen 
Scoring in Public Services’, Cardiff University, 2018. 
25. See West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner and West Midlands Police 
Ethics Committee, papers from committee meeting, April 2019, <https://www.
westmidlands-pcc.gov.uk/archive/april-2019/>, accessed 14 August 2019.
26. Petros Terzis, Marion Oswald and Christine Rinik, ‘Shaping the State of Machine 
Learning Algorithms Within Policing’, workshop report, University of Winchester, 
June 2019. 
27. Authors’ telephone interview with L6, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 10 July 2019. 
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RISK OF BIAS IN ALGORITHMIC POLICE 
DECISION-MAKING
This overview focuses on the application of the law of England and Wales to 
algorithmic tools in policing, together with key ethical, practical and policy 
issues. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the underlying legal basis 
for the use of algorithmic tools for policing, including positive obligations 
under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)28 (right 
to life), or the potential need for primary legislation, although these are 
crucial issues that should be considered in parallel.29 In this project, ‘bias’ is 
understood not only as indicating incomplete or unrepresentative datasets, 
but instead takes a broader view of the whole decision-making process. This 
project approaches ‘bias’ as it relates to:
• Outcomes or processes which are systematically less favourable to 
individuals within a particular group where there is no justification for 
such difference, thereby creating new targeted groups not necessarily 
linked to protected characteristics.30
• Direct or indirect discrimination on the grounds of protected 
characteristics, in contravention of the Equality Act 201031 and 
Article 14 of ECHR.
• Real or apparent skewing of the decision-making process such that it 
is or would appear unfair, including where the decision had in practice 
been predetermined.32
There is a risk that focusing on ‘fixing’ bias as a matter of ‘data’ may 
distract from wider questions of whether a predictive algorithmic system 
should be used at all in a particular policing context.33 The context of 
austerity raises questions about the justifiability of using algorithmic tools 
to increase efficiency, where they may not be necessary if more resources 
were available.34 Therefore, the risk of bias is considered not only in terms 
of data inputs and outputs, but from a contextual perspective, within the 
28. ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, 
1950.
29. For an assessment of the legal basis of live facial recognition, see Pete Fussey 
and Daragh Murray, ‘Independent Report on the London Metropolitan’s Police 
Service’s Trial of Live Facial Recognition Technology’, The Human Rights, Big Data 
and Technology Project, July 2019.
30. Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick and Genle Barton, ‘Algorithmic Bias Detection and 
Mitigation: Best Practices and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms’, Brookings, 
22 May 2019.
31. ‘Equality Act 2010 (UK)’, c.15.
32. This reflects, in particular, administrative law natural justice (rules of fair 
administrative procedure applicable to public bodies) and Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR.
33. Julia Powles, ‘The Seductive Diversion of “Solving” Bias in Artificial Intelligence’, 
Medium, 7 December 2018. 
34. Author’s telephone interview with L1, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 1 July 2019.
BRIEFING PAPER 10
main stages of a project lifecycle. As one senior police officer commented, 
‘The big issue in policing is not the technology. It’s what the military call the 
“capability stack” – the combination of the technology, the people and the 
processes that need to be considered’.35
Several legal frameworks and codes of practice are relevant to the development 
and deployment of predictive algorithms in England and Wales, including: 
• Data protection, specifically Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018.36
• Prohibited discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 and the public 
sector equality duty.37
• Obligations pursuant to the ECHR and section 6 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998.38
• Statutory responsibilities regarding coercive and investigatory 
powers.39
• Requirements pursuant to the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 relating to investigation, prosecution and 
disclosure of evidence.40 
• The duties of the police within the common law.
• Administrative law principles applicable to lawful public sector 
decision-making.41
• College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice,42 including the 
Code of Ethics43 and Management of Police Information guidelines.44
35. Authors’ telephone interview with L8, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 23 July 2019.
36. ‘Data Protection Act 2018 (UK)’, Part 3; Council of the European Union, ‘Directive 
(EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016’, 
Official Journal of the European Union (L 119).
37. ‘Equality Act 2010 (UK)’, c.15, s149.
38. ‘Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)’; ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms’.
39. For instance, within the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, and 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
40. ‘Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (UK)’, c.25.
41. Marion Oswald, ‘Algorithmic-Assisted Decision-Making in the Public Sector: 
Framing the Issues Using Administrative Law Rules Governing Discretionary 
Power’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A (Vol. 376, No. 2128, 
2018); Jamie Grace, ‘“Algorithmic Impropriety” in UK Policing?’, Journal of 
Information Rights, Policy and Practice (Vol. 3, No. 1, 2019); Jennifer Cobbe, 
‘Administrative Law and the Machines of Government: Judicial Review of 
Automated Public-Sector Decision-Making’, Legal Studies (forthcoming). 
42. College of Policing, ‘Authorised Professional Practice’, <https://www.app.college.
police.uk/app-content/>, accessed 23 August 2019. 
43. College of Policing, ‘Code of Ethics’, <https://www.college.police.uk/What-we-
do/Ethics/Ethics-home/Pages/Code-of-Ethics.aspx>, accessed 23 August 2019. 
44. College of Policing, ‘Authorised Professional Practice: Management of Police 
Information’, <https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/information-
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The project of which this paper is part assesses the risk of bias in algorithmic 
decision-making in relation to these frameworks. 
TYPES OF POTENTIAL BIAS IN THE PROJECT LIFECYCLE
Problem and Solution Identification 
An increased emphasis on the preventive and public safety aspects of the 
police’s role, coupled with a significant reduction in resources since 2010, has 
led to a perceived need to prioritise based on data-driven assessments of 
risk.45 However, bias can arise when choosing which specific crime problems 
will be the subject of such data-driven assessments. At the ‘problem 
identification’ phase, predictive technological solutions have been criticised 
for focusing on low-level ‘nuisance’ crime, or on areas with high crime levels 
and thus poor neighbourhoods.46 One academic expert suggested that bias 
may arise via the police’s conception of a problem (and thus input data 
would reflect only this conception), for example the conception of a ‘gang’ 
framed around a single demographic.47 
Despite general cuts in police funding since 2010, specific funds for ‘digital 
transformation’ have been made available, such as the Police Transformation 
Fund, ‘creating strong incentives for forces to frame the development 
around digital technology to receive further central support’.48 This may 
create a bias in favour of digital solutions, and the risk of modelling complex 
social issues in an overly simplistic way,49 without equal consideration of 
non-technological measures. This raises questions regarding necessity and 
proportionality and data minimisation issues if the use of digital solutions 
results in increased data collection to build, test and monitor a model. An 
academic expert suggested that, where adoption of predictive policing 
occurs rapidly, ‘what is often missing … is a testing and assessment of the 
risks and long-term benefits that these systems may provide’.50 Another 
police respondent pointed to ‘a risk that we procure capabilities based on 
opinion-based decisions rather than evidence-based decisions’.51 With this 
management/management-of-police-information/>, accessed 23 August 2019.   
45. Dencik et al., ‘Data Scores as Governance’. 
46. Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality 
and Threatens Democracy (New York, NY: Penguin, 2016).
47. Author’s telephone interview with A5, academic expert in policing policy and 
practice, 11 July 2019.
48. The Law Society Commission on the Use of Algorithms in the Justice System 
and The Law Society of England and Wales, ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice 
System’, p. 13.
49. Author’s telephone interview with A4, academic expert in human rights and 
technology, 11 July 2019.
50. Author’s interview with A3, academic expert in information law and data 
protection, London, 28 June 2019. 
51. Author’s telephone interview with L1, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 1 July 2019.
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in mind, the choice of whether to implement a particular new technological 
capability may itself be subject to bias. 
Design and Testing
Previous research has demonstrated how choices about defining target 
variables (the thing that the model is trying to predict) and input variables 
(the factors taken into account during computation) may adversely impact 
protected classes.52 
Algorithms that are trained on police data ‘may replicate (and in some 
cases amplify) the existing biases inherent in the dataset’,53 such as over- 
or under-policing of certain communities, or data that reflects flawed or 
illegal practices54 (raising further issues regarding the requirement of 
accuracy pursuant to the Data Protection Act).55 A police officer interviewed 
commented that ‘young black men are more likely to be stop and searched 
than young white men, and that’s purely down to human bias. That human 
bias is then introduced into the datasets, and bias is then generated in the 
outcomes of the application of those datasets’.56 The effects of a biased 
sample could be amplified by algorithmic predictions via a feedback loop,57 
whereby future policing is predicted, not future crime.58 Another officer 
commented that ‘we pile loads of resources into a certain area and it becomes 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, purely because there’s more policing going into 
that area, not necessarily because of discrimination on the part of officers’.59
In addition to these biases inherent in police data, individuals from 
disadvantaged sociodemographic backgrounds are likely to engage with 
public services more frequently, meaning the police often have access to 
more data relating to these individuals, which may in turn lead to them being 
calculated as posing a greater risk. Seemingly relevant data could also serve 
as proxies for protected characteristics (and sensitive data under the Data 
Protection Act) – for example, home address or number of stop-and-searches 
52. Solon Barocas and Andrew D Selbst, ‘Big Data’s Disparate Impact’, California Law 
Review (Vol. 104, 2016), p. 671.
53. Babuta, Oswald and Rinik, ‘Machine Learning Algorithms and Police  
Decision-Making’.
54. Rashida Richardson et al., ‘Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights 
Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice’, New York 
University Law Review Online (forthcoming).
55. ‘Data Protection Act 2018 (UK)’, c. 12, ss. 37, 38.
56. Author’s telephone interview with L1, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 1 July 2019.
57. Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Discrimination, Artificial Intelligence and 
Algorithmic Decision-Making’, Council of Europe, 2018.
58. Danielle Ensign et al., ‘Runaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing’, 
Proceedings of Machine Learning Research (Vol. 81, 2018), pp. 1–12. 
59. Author’s telephone interview with L2 and L3, representatives of UK law 
enforcement agency, 4 July 2019. 
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as proxies for ethnicity. In terms of the use of protected characteristics 
themselves, discrimination claims could be brought by individuals scored 
‘negatively’ in comparison to others of different ages or gender, and race 
discrimination claims brought where postcode is a proxy for race,60 although 
the claimant would need to show less favourable treatment. This may prove 
complicated when ‘less favourable treatment’ could amount to not being 
subject to a particular intervention, for instance an out-of-court disposal 
scheme such as Durham Constabulary’s Checkpoint Programme.
Complications arise when a model must account for legitimate differences 
in offending across demographics. For instance, men commit crime at 
significantly higher rates than women and are more likely to commit violent 
offences.61 Age is also strongly correlated with offending: it is well known 
that offending tends to peak in the teenage years and then decay over time.62
Scores of ‘predictive accuracy’ derived from retrospective validation are 
representative only of that sample, and do not account for model shrinkage 
when the algorithm is applied to new, unfamiliar data.63 While typically 
presented as an individual-level prediction, the output from an offender 
assessment tool can be better understood as a group-level classification, 
describing the extent to which group members conform to a certain ‘profile’ 
identified in historic data, raising questions of fairness under data protection 
and human rights principles.64 Percentage accuracy rates may also disguise 
high percentage false positives or negatives which could negatively impact 
60. Robin Allen and Dee Masters, ‘Algorithms, Apps & Artificial Intelligence: The 
Next Frontier in Discrimination Law’, updated for the Public Law Project session 
entitled ‘AI Justice: Artificial Intelligence Decision-Making and the Law’ on 16 
October 2018, Cloisters, 2018.
61. See Jennifer Schwartz et al., ‘Trends in the Gender Gap in Violence: Reevaluating 
NCVS and Other Evidence’, Criminology (Vol. 47, No. 2, June 2009), pp. 401–25.
62. David P Farrington, ‘Age and Crime’, Crime and Justice (Vol. 7, 1986), pp. 189–250. 
For further discussion, see, for example, Stephen D Hart, Christine Michie and 
David J Cooke, ‘Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments: Evaluating 
the “Margins of Error” of Group v. Individual Predictions of Violence’, British 
Journal of Psychiatry (Vol. 190, No. S49, 2007), s63; Nancy R Cook and Nina P 
Paynter, ‘Performance of Reclassification Statistics in Comparing Risk Prediction 
Models’, Biometrical Journal (Vol. 53, No. 2, March 2011), p. 237.
63. Chris Webster, Quazi Haque and Stephen J Hucker, Violence Risk: Assessment and 
Management: Advances Through Structured Professional Judgement and Sequential 
Redirections, 2nd Edition (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), p. xiii; Kevin S 
Douglas, Melissa Yeomans and Douglas P Boer, ‘Comparative Validity Analysis of 
Multiple Measures of Violence Risk in a Sample of Criminal Offenders’, Criminal 
Justice and Behavior (Vol. 32, No. 5, October 2005), pp. 501–02. 
64. Laurens Naudts, ‘How Machine Learning Generates Unfair Inequalities and How 
Data Protection Instruments May Help in Mitigating Them’, in Ronald Leenes et 
al. (eds), Data Protection and Privacy: The Internet of Bodies (Hart, 2018).
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on certain groups.65 Furthermore, limiting the testing phase to statistical 
accuracy could mean that risks related to automation bias are missed, if 
the testing phase only assesses the algorithm itself rather than the overall 
decision-making process the tool is feeding into.66 
The CDEI-commissioned Landscape Summary on bias in algorithmic 
decision-making identified proprietary (closed-source) software as a 
factor likely to impede scrutiny of bias.67 A number of academic experts 
interviewed pointed to potential issues with off-the-shelf machine learning 
tools where there is no access to the training data (requiring beta testing with 
new data to assess bias).68 It was noted that a system’s procurer requires 
considerable scope to inspect and challenge a tool, almost undermining 
the point of outsourcing.69 Furthermore, outsourcing risks a loss of control 
over the provenance of input datasets, which may have been developed for 
non-law enforcement purposes, in different law enforcement environments 
or according to different standards.70 As one police officer commented: 
‘We wouldn’t outsource our arrests, we wouldn’t outsource our intelligence 
functions. Why are we outsourcing analysts?’71 
Deployment 
Deployment of a predictive algorithm may result in important contextual 
information being disregarded, which could introduce systematic bias 
into the decision-making chain in an effort to ‘streamline’ the process. For 
instance, a decision on detention post-arrest based on a predictive output 
could be skewed if the algorithm only uses data confirming risk as opposed 
to data demonstrating the opposite.72 
65. Julia Angwin et al., ‘Machine Bias’, ProPublica, 23 May 2016, <https://www.
propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing>, 
accessed 14 August 2019. 
66. Alex Albright, ‘If You Give a Judge a Risk Score: Evidence from Kentucky 
Bail Decisions’, The Little Dataset, 15 July 2019, <https://thelittledataset.
com/2019/07/15/if-you-give-a-judge-a-risk-score/>, accessed 14 August 2019.
67. Michael Rovatsos, Brent Mittelstadt and Ansgar Koene, ‘Landscape Summary: Bias 
in Algorithmic Decision-Making’, CDEI, 2019.
68. Author’s telephone interview with A1, academic expert in data protection, 
privacy and surveillance policy, 28 June 2019.
69. Author’s interview with A2, academic expert in computer science and data 
protection, London, 28 June 2019.
70. See Orla Lynskey, ‘Criminal Justice Profiling and EU Data Protection Law: 
Precarious Protection from Predictive Policing’, International Journal of Law in 
Context (Vol. 15, Special Issue 2, June 2019), pp. 162–76. 
71. Author’s telephone interview with L4, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 9 July 2019. 
72. Dencik et al., ‘Data Scores as Governance’. 
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Bias may also occur in the way that the human decision-maker adheres to 
or deviates from the algorithm’s prediction or insight.73 A factor which may 
arise during deployment (thus necessitating attention during design) is the 
risk of automation bias, the tendency to over-rely on automated outputs 
and discount other correct and relevant information.74 Inappropriate 
fettering of discretion through use of an algorithm may make the resulting 
decision unfair,75 or de facto an automated one.76 As explained by one police 
officer interviewed: ‘Officers often disagree with the algorithm. I’d expect and 
welcome that challenge. The point where you don’t get that challenge, that’s 
when people are putting that professional judgement aside’.77 However, 
another officer noted that ‘professional judgement might just be another 
word for bias’, explaining that ‘whenever we have to decide an outcome 
there’s always an opportunity for bias’.78 It is essential that the correct 
balance is struck to ensure due regard is paid to the insights derived from 
analytics, without making officers over-reliant on the tool and causing them 
to disregard other relevant factors. Adequate training focused on cognitive 
bias and fair decision-making would appear essential to ensure officers are 
able to consistently achieve the correct balance.  
Furthermore, while the risk of cognitive bias is often used to argue in favour 
of the statistical approach, a ‘risk score’ is potentially highly prejudicial to the 
decision-maker.79 One police respondent referred to the output getting ‘into the 
head’ of the officer.80 Quantifications of risk are also liable to misinterpretation 
by those not directly involved in the assessment.81 For example, a ‘low-risk’ 
label could be interpreted to mean that an individual requires no further 
monitoring or intervention. Yet such ‘low-risk’ individuals may have specific 
needs that should be addressed as part of a bespoke risk-management plan. 
Such individuals may then fail to receive the support to prevent them returning 
to problematic behaviour.
73. Albright, ‘If You Give a Judge a Risk Score’; Bo Cowgill, ‘The Impact of Algorithms on 
Judicial Discretion: Evidence from Regression Discontinuities’, working paper, 2018, 
<http://www.columbia.edu/~bc2656/workingpapers.html>, accessed 14 August 2019. 
74. Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Technological Due Process’, Washington University Law 
Review (Vol. 85, No. 6, 2008).
75. Oswald, ‘Algorithmic-Assisted Decision-Making in the Public Sector’.
76. ‘Data Protection Act 2018 (UK)’, Part 3.
77. Author’s telephone interview with L4, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 9 July 2019. 
78. Author’s telephone interview with L1, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 1 July 2019. 
79. David J Cooke, ‘More Prejudicial than Probative’, Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland (Vol. 55, No. 1, 2010), pp. 20–23; David J Cooke and Christine Michie, 
‘Violence Risk Assessment: From Prediction to Understanding – Or From What? 
To Why?’, in Caroline Logan and Lorraine Johnstone (eds), Managing Clinical 
Risk: A Guide to Effective Practice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 10.
80. Authors’ telephone interview with L6, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 10 July 2019.
81. Cooke, ‘More Prejudicial than Probative’.
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Figure 1: Risk of Bias in Implementation and Oversight of Police Algorithms
Source: The authors.
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EMERGING FINDINGS
Interviews conducted to date evidence a desire for clearer national guidance 
and leadership in the area of data analytics, and widespread recognition 
and appreciation of the need for legality, consistency, scientific validity and 
oversight. It is also apparent that systematic investigation of claimed benefits 
and drawbacks is required before moving ahead with full-scale deployment 
of new technology.82 As one law enforcement practitioner commented, 
‘there’s as much value in understanding what doesn’t work, as what does’,83 
but to achieve this, controlled space for experimentation is required, 
recognising that ‘policing is about dealing with complexity, ambiguity and 
inconsistency’.84
Lessons can be learned from recent trials of live facial recognition, particularly 
concerning the need to demonstrate an explicit legal basis for the use of new 
technology, the need for clearer guidance relating to trials and evaluation, and 
the importance of meaningful public engagement during the development 
and testing phase. The development of a draft Code of Practice provides 
an opportunity, not only to consider bias, but to improve understanding of 
the application of data analytics in different contexts, and of methods of 
assessing potential benefits and intrusions. It will be incumbent on users to 
evidence such assessments when determining whether use of a particular 
tool can be deemed ‘necessary’, in order to decide whether there are less 
intrusive means of achieving the same policing aim.85
Any new code of practice for algorithmic tools in policing should establish a 
standard process for model design, development, trialling, and deployment, 
along with ongoing monitoring and evaluation. It should provide clear 
operationally relevant guidelines and complement existing authorised 
professional practice and other guidance in a tech-agnostic way.86 Existing 
surveillance codes and related inspections were suggested by a number of 
interviewees as a potential model. The new code should ensure sufficient 
attention is paid to meeting legal and ethical requirements throughout all 
stages of the product lifecycle, from project inception through to model 
procurement, development and testing, including ongoing tracking and 
mitigation of discrimination risk when the tool is deployed operationally, 
82. See Albert Meijer and Martijn Wessels, ‘Predictive Policing: Review of Benefits 
and Drawbacks’, International Journal of Public Administration (Vol. 42, No. 12, 
2019), pp. 1–9.
83. Author’s telephone interview with L7, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 18 July 2019.
84. Authors’ telephone interview with L8, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 23 July 2019.
85. Author’s telephone interview with A4, academic expert in human rights and 
technology, 11 July 2019.
86. Author’s telephone interview with L1, representative of UK law enforcement 
agency, 1 July 2019.
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and oversight of the ultimate decision-making process the analytical insights 
are feeding into.87 
A new code should specify clear roles and responsibilities regarding 
scrutiny, regulation and enforcement, including the roles of the College 
of Policing, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services and the Home Office, and 
potentially other regulatory bodies such as the Information Commissioner’s 
Office and Investigatory Powers Commissioners. The code should also 
establish standard processes for independent ethical review and oversight 
to ensure transparency and accountability and facilitate meaningful public 
engagement before tools are deployed operationally. 
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